



SOURCES OF CONSERVATIVE THINKING  
ON DEMOCRACY 
STEPHEN E. GOTTLIEB† 
I. IDEOLOGICAL ATTACKS ON DEMOCRACY 
Not all conservatives are hostile to democracy or question the legitimacy 
of the democratic process, but many do, and their hostility matters. This is an 
attempt to describe, explain, and address that hostility. Most prominently, a 
large group of conservatives treat the marketplace as better than regulation, 
implicitly attacking democracy and rendering illegitimate democratic 
attempts to shape the marketplace in the common interest. 
A.  The Market Supersedes Democracy 
The business sector argues for laissez faire principles and against 
regulation. In reaction to the totalitarian regimes of Hitler and Stalin, 
“conservatives” seized on collectivist politics as the threat. 
Ayn Rand emigrated from Soviet Russia to help show American 
conservatives that government is the problem and capitalism is the solution. 
Her worldview was Hobbesian, rejecting the unselfish, collective spirit the 
founding generation sought to instill.1 Ignoring Cardozo’s warning against 
“[t]he tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic,”2 Rand 
decided the enemy was not merely the totalitarian state but government itself. 
As she stated, “The only function of the government, in [a capitalist] society, 
 
† Jay and Ruth Caplan Distinguished Professor of Law, Albany Law School. B.A., 1962, 
Princeton University; LL.B., 1965, Yale Law School. His most recent book is UNFIT FOR 
DEMOCRACY: THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE BREAKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2016). 
1 She celebrated this worldview in wildly successful novels. See generally, e.g., AYN RAND, 
ATLAS SHRUGGED (1957); AYN RAND, THE FOUNTAINHEAD (1943). 
2 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921). 
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is . . . the task of protecting [man] from physical force.”3 Everything else gets 
in man’s way. De Tocqueville described Americans using collective action for 
the common good, an antidote to rampant individualism.4 But Rand was 
suspicious of collectives, urging reason and individualism instead. 
“[C]apitalism is the only system that can uphold and protect” individual 
rights because it promotes an ideology of freedom.5 
Rand was no democracy devotee; her ideas were elitist. Public choices 
often repelled her. Nevertheless, if democracy depends on individual 
freedom, it also depends on capitalism. Capitalism, she thought, permits 
virtue since everyone stands on their own ground.6 Government power leads 
only to more power. 
Virtue conflicts with conservative libertarianism. In the moralist 
tradition, conservatives turn to homogeneity, small communities, shared 
traditions, and mutual oversight.7 Some argue devotion to family breeds 
virtue, despite obvious counterexamples. Others argue for federalism, though 
“states’ rights” have mounted the greatest of abuses. Rand disliked moralist 
conservatives—theirs were merely collectives ruling the individual. She 
frequently supported Democrats.8 
Friedrich Hayek wrote The Road to Serfdom abroad before settling in 
America at the University of Chicago.9 He argued for more freedom by 
opposing everything that smacked of Russian style economic planning. The 
 
3 Ayn Rand, What Is Capitalism?, in CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 11, 19 (Ayn Rand ed., 1967). 
4 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 466 (Bruce Frohnen ed., 2002). 
5 Ayn Rand, Man’s Rights, in THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS: A NEW CONCEPT OF EGOISM 
108, 108 (Ayn Rand ed., 1961). 
6 See Rand, What Is Capitalism?, supra note 3, at 19-20 (stating that the moral justification for 
capitalism is that it protects man’s individual freedom to build relationships voluntarily, protecting 
the creative mind from unwanted intrusion). 
7 See ROBERT DEVIGNE, RECASTING CONSERVATISM: OAKESHOTT, STRAUSS, AND THE 
RESPONSE TO POSTMODERNISM 95 (1994) (“The[se] conservatives reject this notion that the 
national state should foster community and social justice.”); William A. Schambra, Progressive 
Liberalism and American “Community,” 80 PUB. INT., Summer 1985, at 31, 40 (discussing dissatisfaction 
with the “national community” movements in conservative America during the 1960s and 1970s). 
8 See generally Ayn Rand, Conservatism: An Obituary, in CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 
192 (Ayn Rand ed., 1967). Her point is that altruism conflicts with freedom, so all moralisms are constraints 
on human beings. See also Frank James, Ayn Rand: Conservatives’ Abortion-Rights, Anti-Religion 
Inspiration, N.P.R. (Nov. 14, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2011/11/14/14 
2300606/ayn-rand-conservatives-pro-abortion-anti-religion-inspiration [https://perma.cc/U6VJ-XAMP] 
(stating that conservatives who view Rand as a “conservative hero” are “cherrypicking her ideas”); 
Ayn Rand, POV: Ayn Rand Excerpts on Religion, AYN RAND INST. (1988), https://ari.aynrand.org/ 
issues/culture-and-society/religion-and-morality/Lexicon-excerpts-on-Religion#filter-bar [https:// 
perma.cc/K7QJ-YZ6F] (summarizing Rand’s views on life, morality, and religion); William R. 
Thrones, Myth: Ayn Rand Was a Conservative, ATLAS SOCIETY (May 2, 2011), 
http://atlassociety.org/commentary/commentary-blog/3448-myth-ayn-rand-was-a-conservative [https:// 
perma.cc/M38D-ZWWG] (arguing that Rand was not a conservative). 
9 F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, at xvii (1944). 
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Road to Serfdom made government planning the enemy—the less the better. 
Hayek did not support everything capitalists wanted. Monopolies could be 
antagonistic to both democracy and capitalism, especially with government 
protection.10 Nor did he assume capitalism fostered democracy. But central 
planning would destroy democracy because efficiency cannot be accomplished 
democratically.11 Trying it would hollow out democratic controls. He claimed 
only that democracy is “possible” in a capitalist system.12 
For Hayek, democracy was a means toward freedom.13 But people 
demanding legal rulings or changes undermine the rule of law.14 And 
“distributive justice,” a fair distribution of the rewards of economic activity, 
conflicts with the rule of law.15 Laws “under the name of the Welfare State 
. . . need[] very careful sorting-out [to avoid] full-fledged socialism.”16 His 
general argument is critical of the effects of democracy and fearful of demands for 
economic justice. Business needs rules applied without exceptions. Particularly 
problematic were the administrative mechanisms of modern government.17 
Rand’s and Hayek’s encomiums on individualism fit American attitudes 
well, except when national emergencies keep them in check. Joseph 
Schumpeter’s counterargument, that America already had a bureaucratically 
run economy,18 identified precisely what angered conservatives. 
In 1955, William F. Buckley, the brother of James L. Buckley who would later 
be a plaintiff in Buckley v. Valeo, founded National Review and wrote in its 
Credenda that “[t]he most alarming single danger to the American political 
system” is “Fabian” social democracy.19 He focused on “[t]he competitive price 
system” as under attack and needing defense.20 Further, he included monopolies 
as a threat but thought business was in danger and unions were the problem.21 
The 2010 Mount Vernon Statement of Constitutional Conservatism 
elaborated: “Constitutional conservatism . . . . encourages free enterprise, the 
individual entrepreneur, and economic reforms grounded in market  
 
10 See id. at 46-47 (comparing the evils of corporate collusive control over industry to communism). 
11 Id. at 77-79. 
12 See id. at 77-78 (discussing how democracy and central planning inevitably lead to loss of 
individual freedom). 
13 Id. at 78. 
14 Id. at 90-91. 
15 Id. at 87-88. 
16 Id. at xxxiv. 
17 See id. at 87-89 (decrying the “socialization of the law”). 
18 See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY (1943) 
(predicting the inevitable evolution of capitalism into socialism). 
19 William F. Buckley, Jr., Our Mission Statement, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 19, 1955), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/about [https://perma.cc/B6ZW-TEJZ]. 
20 Id. 
21 Id.   
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solutions . . . .”22 It mentions “popular will” only where consistent with “the 
principle of limited government based on the rule of law.”23 In these 
documents the “market” underlies liberty and capitalism; it limits democracy. 
Another strand of conservative thought is the primacy of consent. The 
market is imagined as governed by mutual consent, making a simplified 
understanding of capitalism the moral paradigm of conservative thought.24 
John Locke’s notion of consent to the system of government was not to 
oppose government, but to control it.25 In modern conservative thought, 
people have an individual right to reject government power beyond the 
control of force and fraud. For instance, what galled conservatives about the 
Affordable Care Act health care legislation was the mandate to buy health 
insurance.26 Conservative philosophers deny other bases of authority and 
obligation.27 But their view of consent justifies only unanimous political 
action.28 James Buchanan once floated that idea, but later concluded that rules 
are often valuable even when unanimity is impossible.29 Still, in economic 
matters, modern conservatism favors consent and unanimity over other values.30 
Since conservatives require no consent for the existing conditions, they 
make consent conservative; only change requires consent,31 preventing 
correction of injuries defined by other moral obligations, and turning “minority 
rights” into conservative control. This branch of conservative theory is 
therefore largely in conflict with all other moral obligations, including the 
principle of majority rule or self-government. 
 
22 The Mount Vernon Statement, MOUNT VERNON STATEMENT (Feb. 17, 2010) 
http://www.themountvernonstatement.com/ [https://perma.cc/N47S-BV5J]. 
23 Id. 
24 See infra notes 25, 27, and 28. 
25 On consent, see generally DONALD S. LUTZ, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR 
CONTROL: WHIG POLITICAL THEORY IN THE EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1980). 
26 Michael Cooper, Conservatives Sowed Idea of Health Care Mandate, Only to Spurn It Later, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/15/health/policy/health-care-mandate- 
was-first-backed-by-conservatives.html [https://perma.cc/9DHU-NR6Y]. 
27 See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (attacking the legitimacy 
of state action to benefit others rather than allowing everyone to act solely for their own good). 
28 On unanimous consent, see generally IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRACY’S PLACE (1996). 
29 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND 
LEVIATHAN 163-64 (1975) (“Law is not only public; law is public capital.”). 
30 See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (developing an expansive interpretation of the protections of the 
Eminent Domain Clause). 
31 Compare John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government (1851) (discussing how there must 
be structural protections within government to give minority interests a check against majority 
action), in UNION AND LIBERTY 3, 20-22 (Ross M. Lence ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 1992), with 
SHAPIRO, supra note 28, at 17-52 (critiquing theories of unanimous consent). 
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B.  The People Are Dangerous 
Rand, Hayek, and consent-based theories undergird libertarian and free 
market ideologies. Conservatives take a contrary position from Leo Strauss, 
a refugee from Nazi Germany. How to read Strauss is controversial.32 The 
following describes what prominent conservatives take from him.33 As many 
read Strauss, the rise of Hitler was about the failure of ideology. 
Conservatives take from Strauss the corporate leadership’s obligation to rule 
within traditional electoral forms. Strauss rejected any unshakable bedrock 
for moral truths. From the lack of a logically demonstrable foundation, 
conservatives read Strauss as leaping to relativism. Logically, the nonprovability 
of propositions does not demonstrate their moral equality.34 But their 
argument is that the Nazis took over because some Germans had absorbed 
this highly contestable philosophical claim,35 though German aristocrats 
handed the reins to Hitler to preserve their own power. Strauss concluded 
that the people could not deal with the uncertainties of relativism. They 
needed a bedrock. Without it, a Hobbesian world of warring factions beckoned. 
With bedrocks shattering, beliefs must be strengthened. Conservatives 
conclude that liberals are relativists. For liberals, morality depends on what 
injures others. In conservatives’ eyes that makes them relativists, and, for 
Strauss’s followers, liberal relativism destroys the state.36 
The conservative reading of Strauss does not support democracy—democracy 
was the problem. The ability to make choices challenges bedrock beliefs. 
Therefore, people need guidance. American bedrock beliefs include the 
Founders’ work. Hence, while Straussians support the mechanisms the 
Founders created, they do not accept the implications of the underlying 
principles. The attempt to improve democracy, to make it more accountable 
and egalitarian, is precisely the problem. They claim too much democracy, 
accountability, and equality will undermine democracy. In other words, the 
People are dangerous. In separating ultimate truth from politics, Straussians 
argue the leaders’ task is to flout the rules to achieve greater state security.37 
 
32 The late Walter Murphy, my teacher and Strauss’s student, told me shortly before his death 
that Strauss’s claim that people must be told falsehoods is misunderstood. Cf. JOHN GRAY, BLACK 
MASS: APOCALYPTIC RELIGION AND THE DEATH OF UTOPIA 133 (2007) (“The idea that Strauss’s 
work sanctions deception is questionable.”). On Strauss’s views on American conservatism, see 
Nathan Tarcov, Leo Strauss and American Conservative Thought and Politics, in NOMOS  
LVI: AMERICAN CONSERVATISM 381 (Sanford Levinson et al. eds., 2016); Alan Gilbert, Segregation, 
Aggression, and Executive Power: Leo Strauss and “the Boys”, in NOMOS LVI supra. 
33 On Strauss, I draw heavily from DEVIGNE, supra note 7. 
34 See GRAY, supra note 32, at 131-34 (discussing the logical weaknesses of Strauss’s philosophy). 
35 Cf. DEVIGNE, supra note 7, at 48-49, 69-74, 177-79 (discussing Strauss’s political philosophy). 
36 See GRAY, supra note 32, at 131-34 (referring to liberalism as the “failure” of modernism). 
37 Cf. DEVIGNE, supra note 7, at 48-49, 69-74, 177-79 (discussing conservative political philosophy). 
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Leaders are inherently above the law. For Straussians, deception of the American 
people, whether about Iraqi weapons or sending arms to Contras in the teeth of a 
statutory prohibition, were acts of leadership. But Clinton’s sexual immorality was 
a serious problem because it undermined popular faith and morality. 
Many neoconservatives and Straussians argue that capitalism undermines 
community spirit and democracy by placing a premium on selfish behavior.38 
They argue that capitalism can destroy itself as there is no standard; instead 
it is simply who gains and who loses. What some call “unregulated” simply 
means that the law favors the rights of one of the parties. The moral rules of 
capitalism can either promote constructive self-reliance and generosity or 
encourage an egoism and corruption that destroys the community, or perhaps both. 
Some conservatives, then, treat capitalism and democracy as limited to 
consent or unanimity, except for the exclusion of force, fraud, and slavery. 
Straussians, by contrast, are more devoted to tradition than to specific 
conceptions of capitalism or democracy. 
II.  CAPITALIST ATTITUDES ABOUT DEMOCRACY 
Polling data in the United States links support for capitalism with reduced 
support for important mechanisms of democracy, and vice versa.39 Working in 
the early 1980s, Herbert McClosky and John Zaller found general support for 
elections but skepticism about the underpinnings of democracy40: universal 
suffrage which is central to democracy; free speech which empowers intelligent 
votes; religious and ancestral equality which affects participation in and 
fairness by democracy;41 and treatment of the accused, manipulated by 
autocracies to cow and control the population.42 Collectively they reflect a 
willingness to take account of others, essential for democratic systems. 
For capitalist values, McClosky and Zaller focused on ownership rights. 
Those most invested in ownership show less support for other liberties and 
those who most support civil liberties and equality show less support for 
 
38 See id. at 59-64 (discussing the views of neoconservatives). See generally DANIEL BELL, THE 
CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1976) (arguing that American capitalism 
substituted material hedonism for a traditional sense of Protestant work ethic). 
39 See infra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
40 HERBERT MCCLOSKY & JOHN ZALLER, THE AMERICAN ETHOS: PUBLIC ATTITUDES 
TOWARD CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY 162, 181-84 (1984). 
41 Cf. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ¶¶ 95, 96 (Thomas P. Pearson 
ed., Liberal Arts Press, Inc. 1952) (1690) (discussing man’s inherent freedom). 
42 See Steven E. Finkel et al., Democratic Values and Political Tolerance (critiquing public studies 
of democratic values), in MEASURES OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES 203, 207-08, 217-18 (John P. 
Robinson et al. eds., 1999). 
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ownership.43 This mirrors Hayek’s conflict between popular sovereignty and 
the rule of law.44 
Support for universal suffrage showed a small decline among those who most 
supported capitalism.45 And “those who differ in their support for capitalism . . . 
disagree over virtually every other democratic value.”46 The difference is clear 
among the general public and pronounced among the leadership.47 
McClosky and Zaller found those who felt strongest about capitalism 
showed much less support for equality in any form.48 In line with their 
finding, conservatives have enlisted the Supreme Court to limit the scope of 
laws designed to protect equal opportunity or a level playing field.49 
For some strong supporters of capitalism, democracy infringes on their 
freedom of action. They perceive government regulation as burdensome, even 
regulation designed to provide rules of fairness and honesty.50 George W. 
Bush represented this attitude when he labeled Al Gore’s criticisms of tax 
breaks for the wealthy and of corporate power as a mean-spirited attempt “to 
 
43 MCCLOSKY & ZALLER, supra note 40, at 260. 
44 See, e.g., HAYEK, supra note 9, at 87-88 (discussing how popular desire to have central 
government care for individual needs can override rule of law protections). 
45 MCCLOSKY & ZALLER, supra note 40, at 162, 182. 
46 Id. at 184; see also KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY 418 (2002) (noting the 
cyclic tensions between capitalism and democracy); Finkel et al., supra note 42, at 214, 238-43 
(discussing further McClosky & Zaller’s “Democratic Values Scale” thesis); James L. Gibson, The 
Structure of Attitudinal Tolerance in the United States, 19 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 562, 569 (1989) 
(highlighting the weakness of American democracy because of the intolerance Americans tend to 
have against groups they find disagreeable). 
47 MCCLOSKY & ZALLER, supra note 40, at 174; see also Paul M. Sniderman et al., The Fallacy 
of Democratic Elitism: Elite Competition and Commitment to Civil Liberties, 21 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 349, 
351-53 (1991) (supporting the McClosky and Zaller thesis while taking issue with their earlier work). 
48 See MCCLOSKY & ZALLER, supra note 40, at 163, 185 (showing a lack of support for issues 
including equal job opportunities for minorities). 
49 See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (declining to extend Title VI protection 
to language rights); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (finding ADA 
disabilities suits against state entities barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Boy Scouts v. Dale, 530 
U.S. 640 (2000) (upholding a private organization’s right to discriminate against gays); United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (finding a federal law that protected women’s rights an 
unconstitutional extension of Congress’s commerce power); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 
62 (2000) (finding that a federal provision regarding age discrimination unconstitutionally exceeded 
Congress’s authority under the Fourteenth Amendment); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 
U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to race-based classifications); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 
U.S. 237 (1991) (lowering the level of scrutiny regarding segregated neighborhood schools); Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (protecting money in politics as First Amendment expression). But see 
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (protecting access to state courts); Nev. Dep’t of Human 
Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993). 
50 See MCCLOSKY & ZALLER, supra note 40, at 309-10 (presenting a “Capitalist Value Scale” 
including a question about whether government regulation “does more harm than good / is necessary 
to keep industry from becoming too powerful”). 
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wage class warfare to get ahead.”51 Such “class warfare,” in the view of many, 
has no place in a democracy. Efforts to democratize political power can 
restrict or threaten what conservatives think of as their “rights” and what 
liberals would describe as improper “privileges” given to conservatives.52 
Conservatives are less likely to defend the rule of law, including the Bill 
of Rights, in the criminal process.53 Yet, conservatives insist on constitutional 
protections against “regulation” of the market and resist being bound by such 
laws by challenging campaign finance regulations or stripping the Internal 
Revenue Service’s ability to investigate taxpayers. 
III.  CONSEQUENCES OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST GOVERNMENT 
The direction of modern conservatism bears McClosky and Zaller out. 
Conservative ideology actually pushes its attack beyond markets to the door 
of democracy. Free market conservatives deny that democratic institutions 
can profitably regulate the market, while favoring rules that protect large 
monopolies.54 Democracy has a minimal role in “limited government.” 
Insistence on consent narrows the legitimate range of democratic 
decisionmaking. Treating the marketplace as better than regulation implicitly 
attacks democracy, rendering illegitimate democratic attempts to shape the 
marketplace in the common interest. The marketplace model attacks both 
democracy and equality. 
This is explicit in conservative thought. Robert Nozick would deny 
government the right to intervene except to stop force or fraud,55 thus 
preventing the pursuit of the “general welfare.”56 Richard Epstein argues 
taxes unconstitutionally take private property, unless for the benefit of the 
taxpayer.57 His theory had a test run on the Supreme Court but failed when 
Justice O’Connor switched her vote.58 
 
51 Sean Wilentz, Bush’s Ancestors, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 16, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/16/magazine/bushs-ancestors.html [https://perma.cc/3B7J-DPA3]. 
52 There is no neutral term. 
53 For examples, see questions 5, 12, 13, 19, 22, 28, 30, 31, 35, 36, and 39 in McClosky & Zaller’s 
Democratic Values Scale, supra note 40, at 311-14. 
54 See generally William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 
28 J.L. & ECON. 247 (1985) (positing that corporations use antitrust rules to defeat competition). 
55 NOZICK, supra note 27. 
56 U.S. CONST. pmbl.; id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
57 EPSTEIN, supra note 30. 
58 Compare Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 159-60 (1998) (holding that accrued 
interest on money placed in a legal trust account is still private property and cannot be taken by the 
state per the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause), with Brown v. Legal Found., 538 U.S. 216, 240-41 
(2003) (finding no violation of the Takings Clause). 
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Conservative ideology even denies that democratic principles can serve 
as a guide for the conduct of elections.59 A Court majority explicitly 
welcomed plutocracy, cutting out nonlandowners from some elections.60 Bush 
v. Gore literally stopped the Florida count.61 And Buckley v. Valeo insisted that 
the only government interest justifying the regulation of money in politics is 
the prevention of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.62 
The underlying idea here is aristocratic. The conservative revival is not 
about promoting democracy but about controlling it. Social Darwinism was 
more honest.63 
If they went no further than to recognize and try to correct the pitfalls of 
democratic government, liberals and conservatives would remain on common 
ground. Liberals also see the risks of democratic governance. People can be misled. 
Money can influence them via political and issue advertisements to make the wrong 
decisions. Education for everyone is important to strengthen the quality of 
decisions. For liberals, a fair process in which each side is well-represented should 
result in a popular decision that the system is bound to respect. 
But for conservatives, money gives capitalists a way to control the 
multitude. They would subordinate the democratic process to the economic 
marketplace, which they think far superior. 
Those views make it hard to persuade conservatives to improve 
democracy or to make it more responsive to the general public. On the other 
hand, their anti-democracy views are also a potential weakness, best disguised 




59 See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 896-903 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) 
(refusing to look to “standard, practice, or procedure” in interpreting the Voting Rights Act). 
60 Cf. Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 366-71 (1981) (finding that an agency with “narrow” and 
“special” functions is exempt from popular election requirements); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake 
Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 728-30 (1973) (holding that “the popular election 
requirements” do not apply to government agencies with “special limited purpose[s]”). 
61 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (per curiam); see also STEPHEN E. GOTTLIEB, 
MORALITY IMPOSED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND LIBERTY IN AMERICA 38-48 (2000) (noting 
the rejection of democratic values in opinions by conservative justices). 
62 424 U.S. 1, 45-47 (1976). 
63 See ERIC F. GOLDMAN, RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY 90-91 (1952) (discussing Herbert 
Spencer’s Social Darwinist philosophy). 
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IV.  RESPONSES 
The Roberts Court’s output reflects an attachment only to economic 
liberties;64 democracy is not treated as a governing standard. But democracy 
and self-government should be treated as compelling interests, protected in 
the Republican Government Clause,65 built into constitutional language and 
structure, and into its repeated references to liberty.66 In the Founding era, 
there was no greater liberty than self-government.67 
Constitutional interpretation is incoherent without a commitment to 
protect self-government. Every theory of interpretation is purportedly based 
on democratic premises. Therefore, failure to commit to protecting 
democracy, while insisting on its implications, ultimately abandons the 
underlying premise of self-government.68 
The only conservative on the existing Court who sometimes feels the pull 
of democratic values is Justice Kennedy, but only regarding freedom of speech 
and an occasional voting rights case. A mathematical formula for 
gerrymandering was beyond him. 
There is considerable evidence from political scientists, in histories, case 
studies, game theory, and statistical studies confirming the importance of 
classical republican egalitarian thinking and the fair distribution of resources 
to the stability of democracy, and embedded in virtuous and vicious cycles. 
As Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and his colleagues have explained, the broader 
the group who select the leadership, the broader the distribution of benefits 
is likely to be, while the narrower the group who determine the leadership, 
the narrower the distribution of benefits. Both cycles are self-confirming.69 
Infrastructure that benefits the general population, from water to roads and 
health, is more widely distributed in democratic than dictatorial governments, 
where those projects are undertaken only for the benefit of the powerful. 
 
64 See STEPHEN E. GOTTLIEB, UNFIT FOR DEMOCRACY: THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE 
BREAKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 212-26 (2016) (discussing the Court’s recent treatment of 
regulation on business activities). 
65 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
66 Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but Unanalyzed Term in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 955-58 (1988). 
67 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 24-25, 
167-68 (1969) (discussing early American Whig philosophy). On pre-Convention economic and 
regulatory thinking, see generally LOUIS HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC 
THOUGHT: PENNSYLVANIA, 1776-1860 (1968), and WILLIAM J. NOVAK, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF 
THE STATE POLICE POWER: THE COMMON LAW VISION OF A WELL-REGULATED SOCIETY (1989). 
68 See GOTTLIEB, UNFIT FOR DEMOCRACY, supra note 64, at 238-61 (criticizing the Roberts 
Court’s approach to democracy). 
69 See generally BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA & ALASTAIR SMITH, THE DICTATOR’S 
HANDBOOK: WHY BAD BEHAVIOR IS ALMOST ALWAYS GOOD POLITICS (2011); BRUCE BUENO 
DE MESQUITA ET AL., THE LOGIC OF POLITICAL SURVIVAL (2003). 
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The Bueno de Mesquita group’s work explains not only the importance of 
equality to the stability of democracy, but also the output of democracy to the 
distribution of infrastructure. In turn, many of the most reputable scholars 
investigating the links between democracy and development have found that 
the most democratic governments produce better economic results. 
Democracy, rather than a hindrance to development, turns out to be its 
engine.70 At best, some conservative jurists might be interested in such 
studies that relate democracy to economic success. But the thrust of the 
modern conservative argument is not in that direction. 
The public should understand that “ideological” conservatives are trying 
to take people’s votes away, attack democracy, and promote a free market 
ideology above all other democratic values. And the people need to 
understand the benefits that government investment can and has promoted. 
But, although the antiregulatory posture runs counter to the evidence71 and 
antidemocratic, it remains popular. 
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